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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
In this appeal, we review the District Court‟s grant of 
defendants‟ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction based on its determination that plaintiff Gloria 
Washington was domiciled in the Virgin Islands at the time 
she filed her complaint against defendants Hovensa, LLC 
(“Hovensa”) and Triangle Construction and Maintenance, 
Inc. (“Triangle”), notwithstanding her insistence that she was 
domiciled in Texas.  In reviewing a district court‟s conclusion 
regarding where a party is domiciled, our review is for clear 
error as to the court‟s factual determination but de novo as to 
the applicable legal principles and the court‟s conclusions of 
law.  See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 
281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (“A district court‟s determination 
regarding domicile or citizenship is a mixed question of fact 
and law  . . . .”); Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 
(3d Cir. 1972) (“Historical or chronological data which 
underline a court‟s determination of diversity jurisdiction are 
factual in nature.”) (internal citations omitted).   
 
 Although a court‟s inquiry into where a party is 
domiciled involves a predominantly factual determination, 
see McCann, 458 F.3d at 286; Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1300, 
certain well-defined legal precepts can, and in this case, do, 
govern that determination.  Here, we take issue primarily with 
the District Court‟s application of those legal principles to 
reach the conclusion that Washington was domiciled in the 
Virgin Islands.  We also find that the District Court erred in 
concluding that Washington‟s business, domestic and social 
life was centered in St. Croix.  We will accordingly remand 
this case.    
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I. 
 
On April 5, 2006, Gloria Washington was injured 
while driving a rental car on Hovensa‟s property in the Virgin 
Islands.  She alleged in her complaint that, at the time she was 
driving, improperly trained Triangle employees were 
conducting sandblasts without proper supervision or 
barricades and using faulty sandblasting equipment.  A 
sandblast that hit Washington‟s vehicle shattered the driver‟s 
side window, resulting in physical injuries to Washington and 
damage to her rental car.  On July 24, 2006, she filed a 
complaint in the District Court of the Virgin Islands against 
Hovensa and Triangle, citizens of the Virgin Islands, based on 
diversity of citizenship, claiming that they were responsible 
for her physical injuries and the damage to the vehicle.   
 
At the time Washington filed this complaint, she had 
ties to both the Virgin Islands and Texas.  She owned a home 
in Baytown, Texas, but also had an apartment in St. Croix, 
where she had been living and working for seven months.  
She had been employed in Baytown, Texas by Sabine Storage 
Operations, a Texas corporation, but went to the V.I. in 
December 2005 to work as a pipe inspector for Sabine; there, 
she was assigned to work at the Hovensa refinery in St. Croix.  
When asked by opposing counsel at her deposition whether 
she knew, in December 2005, “how long the assignment [at 
the Hovensa refinery] was going to be, or was it indefinite,” 
she replied:  “I didn‟t know.  It was indefinite.”  In 
summarizing her testimony on this point, the District Court 
stated that her “work assignment at the Hovensa refinery was 
for an indefinite period of time,” a fact the Court considered 
“significant.”  
5 
 
 Washington was born in St. Croix, and several of her 
family members, including her mother, sister, and brothers, 
resided there in July 2006.  Upon returning to the Virgin 
Islands in December 2005, Washington rented and furnished 
an apartment that she was living in at the time of the accident.  
The District Court found that her apartment “was in close 
proximity” to her “mother, sisters, brothers, nieces and 
nephews” and that “she socialized with them on a regular 
basis.”  The record clearly establishes only that she lived in 
the same area as her sister and that, at the time of her 
deposition, she went swimming every couple of weeks with 
her family.  In addition, Washington began a romantic 
relationship with a V.I. resident after arriving in St. Croix but 
before filing her complaint.  Between her arrival in St. Croix 
and the time of the accident, Washington had not returned to 
Texas. 
 
At the time she filed her complaint, Washington also 
had several links to Texas:  she owned the home in Baytown, 
Texas, which she was maintaining at the time of the suit and 
in which her daughter now lives; she received mail at her 
Baytown address; her primary care doctor, whom she saw at 
least yearly, was located in Texas; she maintained her Texas 
driver‟s license and owned a car in Texas; she paid taxes in 
Texas; she continued to have a bank account in Texas; she 
maintained a cell phone with a Texas company; and she 
visited Texas about three to five times a year.  Conversely, in 
the V.I., she did not have a primary care physician, a driver‟s 
license, or a bank account, and she had never purchased a 
home or joined any organizations there.  In July 2006, she 
was receiving a $100 per diem from her employer to cover 
her rent and other living expenses during her time in St. 
Croix.  In an affidavit submitted after defendants filed their 
6 
 
motion to dismiss, Washington stated that, when she traveled 
to St. Croix, she intended to return to Texas when her project 
was complete, and to continue to live in Texas.  
 
II. 
 
Washington sued Hovensa and Triangle in the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands on July 24, 2006.  At the end of 
the discovery period that followed, both parties filed motions, 
the disposition of which Washington challenges on appeal.  
After failing to reach an agreement with defendants‟ counsel 
to extend expert discovery deadlines, Washington filed a 
Motion to Extend the Expert Deadlines on the basis that her 
vocationalist and economist did not yet have access to a 
hearing test that they needed in order to testify.  The 
Magistrate Judge denied her motion, which was filed after the 
expiration of the deadline set by the District Court‟s Final 
Scheduling Order, finding that Washington failed to establish 
good cause for modifying the scheduling order under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. Rule 16(b)(4).  
 
Washington also delayed in getting the Independent 
Medical Examination (“IME”) at Triangle‟s expense that the 
parties agreed she would undergo.  She canceled her first 
appointment and refused to have X-rays taken at the second.  
In response, Triangle filed an Emergency Motion for Physical 
Examination of Washington at her expense, which the 
Magistrate Judge granted.  Washington then moved for 
reconsideration, which the Magistrate Judge denied.  
 
After these motions were resolved, defendants filed a 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(h)(3), on the ground that 
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Washington was domiciled in the V.I. when she filed her 
complaint, not in Texas, and, thus, that the District Court 
lacked jurisdiction over her cause of action.  The District 
Court granted defendants‟ motion, finding it significant that 
“the center of [Washington‟s] business, domestic, and social 
life was in St. Croix,” and that she was living and working in 
the V.I. when the complaint was filed.  Washington v. 
Hovensa, LLC, 2010 WL 1734775, at *2 (D.V.I. April 28, 
2010).  It placed particular emphasis on her expectation that 
her job in the V.I. would “continue indefinitely,” relying on 
certain language in Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298 (3d Cir. 
1972).  Id.  There, despite defendant‟s ties to Connecticut, we 
concluded that he was domiciled in Pennsylvania because he 
was to remain there indefinitely.  See Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 
1302-03.  The District Court believed Washington‟s case to 
be analogous.  It acknowledged that Washington owned an 
unoccupied house in Texas and had other ties to that state, but 
ultimately concluded that “her physical presence in the Virgin 
Islands, her intent to work indefinitely in St. Croix, and her 
business and social life there” pointed “decisively” towards 
the Virgin Islands as her domicile.  Washington, 2010 WL 
1734775, at *2.  
 
In determining Washington‟s domicile, the District 
Court determined that her own affidavit statement declaring 
her intention to return to and permanently reside in Texas 
“must be disregarded.”  It explained that “„[o]ne‟s testimony 
as to his intention to establish a domicile, while entitled to 
full and fair consideration, is subject to the infirmity of any 
self-serving declaration, and it cannot prevail to establish 
domicile when it is contradicted or negatived by an 
inconsistent course of conduct; otherwise stated, actions 
speak louder than words.‟”  Id. (quoting Korn v. Korn, 398 
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F.2d 689, 691 (3d Cir. 1968)).  Instead, the Court chose to 
look only to Washington‟s statements prior to defendants‟ 
motion to dismiss and her actions at the time of the filing of 
the complaint. 
 
On appeal, Washington challenges the District Court‟s 
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that, 
at the time she filed her complaint, she was on temporary 
assignment in the Virgin Islands for her Texas employer but 
that she remained a Texas domiciliary who intended to return 
to, and permanently reside in, Texas.  She also challenges the 
Magistrate Judge‟s denial of her Motion to Extend Expert 
Deadlines and grant of Triangle‟s Emergency Motion for 
Physical Examination at Washington‟s expense.  
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, as we are reviewing a final order of the district court. 
 
III. 
 
Under § 1332(a)(1), federal district courts have 
original jurisdiction over civil actions where the matter in 
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 and is 
between “citizens of different States.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(1).  We determine the citizenship of the parties based 
on the relevant facts at the time the complaint was filed.  S. 
Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. 
Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 414 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Smith v. 
Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957)). 
 
A party‟s citizenship is determined by her domicile, 
and “„the domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and 
permanent home and place of habitation.  It is the place to 
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which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of 
returning.‟”  McCann, 458 F.3d at 286 (quoting Vlandis v. 
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973)).  Thus, domicile is 
established by an objective physical presence in the state or 
territory coupled with a subjective intention to remain there 
indefinitely.  See Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 
400-01 (3d Cir. 2008).  When the objective and subjective 
concur, one‟s domicile is immediately established.  Krasnov, 
463 F.3d at 1300.   
 
As we explained in McCann, a court considers several 
factors in determining an individual‟s domicile, including 
“„declarations, exercise of political rights, payment of 
personal taxes, house of residence, and place of business.‟”  
McCann, 458 F.3d at 286 (quoting Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1301 
(internal quotation omitted)).  Other factors to be weighed 
may include “location of brokerage and bank accounts, 
location of spouse and family, membership in unions and 
other organizations, and driver‟s license and vehicle 
registration.”  Id. (citing 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 
3612 (3d ed. 2005)).  More generally, the court must locate 
“the center of one‟s business, domestic, social and civic life.”  
Frett-Smith, 511 F.3d at 401.   
 
IV. 
 
We begin our review of the District Court‟s domicile 
determination by noting a legal precept that may not have 
been stressed before the District Court but that we 
nonetheless consider important.  As we have explained, an 
individual‟s domicile changes instantly if he “takes up 
residence at the new domicile” and “intend[s] to remain 
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there.”  Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1300.  But “„[a] domicile once 
acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have 
been changed.‟”  Korn, 398 F.2d at 691 n.4 (quoting Mitchell 
v. United States, 88 U.S. 350, 353 (1874)).  “This principle,” 
we said in McCann, “gives rise to a presumption favoring an 
established domicile over a new one.”  McCann, 458 F.3d at 
286-87 (citing Acridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good 
Samaritan Soc., 334 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also 
Gutierrez v. Fox, 141 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 1998); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 519 (10th Cir. 
1994); Holmes v. Sopuch, 639 F.2d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1981); 
Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 598 F.2d 698, 701 
(1st Cir. 1979); Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 447 (5th Cir. 
1954); 13B Wright et al., supra, § 3612.   
 
This presumption does not shift the burden of proof to 
establish diversity of citizenship away from the proponent of 
federal jurisdiction; the party asserting diversity jurisdiction – 
here, Washington – retains the burden of proving that 
diversity of citizenship exists by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  See Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1301.  Nevertheless, the 
presumption does demand more from the party seeking to 
establish a new domicile – here, Hovensa and Triangle – than 
if that party were seeking to establish a continuing domicile.  
See 13B Wright et al., supra, § 3612 (“The effect of this 
presumption is to put a heavier burden on a party who is 
trying to show a change of domicile than is placed on one 
who is trying to show the retention of an existing or former 
one.”).1  This “heavier burden” involves “shifting to . . . [the] 
                                              
1
 See also Fed. R. Evid. Rule 301 (“In all civil actions and 
proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or 
by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against 
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party [that bears it] the burden of production regarding the 
change of domicile, not raising the standard of proof.”  
McCann, 458 F.2d 281 at 287 n.3.
2
  When the party “claiming 
a new domicile is the opponent of federal jurisdiction,” as 
here, it “bears the initial burden of producing sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the established 
domicile.”  Id. at 288.  If the opposing party – in this case, 
Washington – is successful, the presumption is defeated, the 
case proceeds, and “the party asserting jurisdiction bears the 
burden of proving diversity of citizenship.”  Id.  
 
Here, while it is conceivable that defendants presented 
enough evidence to meet their burden of production, it is not 
clear from the District Court‟s opinion that it even considered 
                                                                                                     
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with 
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift 
to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of 
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the 
party on whom it was originally cast.”).  
 
2
 The burden of proof in a civil case has two distinct 
components – the burden of going forward with proof, which 
is referred to as the “burden of production,” and the burden of  
persuading the trier of fact, known as the “burden of 
persuasion.”  McCann, 458 F.3d at 287.  “The party bearing 
the burden of persuasion must lose if the evidence is evenly 
balanced.  The burden of production, in contrast, does not 
concern the quantum of proof required for a party to 
ultimately prevail, but instead determines which party must 
first present evidence sufficient to raise a given issue as 
pertinent.”  United States v. Harstock, 347 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 
2003).   
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the presumption as it weighed the evidence.  Where so many 
facts that our caselaw regards as important bolster the 
baseline presumption that Washington retained her 
established residence in Texas – from Washington‟s home 
ownership, driver‟s license, vehicle registration, bank 
account, cell phone, and primary care doctor in Texas to her 
employer‟s per diem payments while she was in the V.I. – 
defendants have a substantial initial hurdle to overcome in 
introducing evidence that Washington was domiciled in the 
V.I..
3
  We are not convinced that, in light of the presumption 
                                              
3
 Numerous cases focus on these very indicia as being 
important.  See, e.g., Frett-Smith, 511 F.3d at 401 (in ruling 
that plaintiff was domiciled in the V.I., emphasizing that she 
filed tax returns in the V.I. and had a U.S.V.I. driver‟s 
license); Muscarello v. Ogle County Bd. of Comm’rs, 610 
F.3d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 2010) (in finding that plaintiff was 
domiciled in Arizona, pointing to her registration to vote in 
Arizona, Arizona driver‟s license, and listing of her Arizona 
address with Medicare and Social Security and on various 
property tax bills); Garcia Perez v. Santaella, 364 F.3d 348, 
352-53 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that plaintiffs were domiciled 
in Florida, which became their “personal and financial base,” 
where they acquired Florida drivers‟ licenses, registered to 
vote there, and opened a Miami bank account that they used 
as their primary account); Schiavone v. Donovan, 2009 WL 
2957315, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2009) (finding that the 
preponderance of evidence supports a Florida domicile 
where, among other facts pointing toward Florida, defendant 
was registered to vote in Florida, had a Florida driver‟s 
license, owned property there, had a bank account and safety 
deposit box there, received a tax exemption there, and 
registered a vehicle and maintained auto insurance there); 
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of continued domicile, the District Court gave the facts 
supporting the presumption of Washington‟s established 
domicile in Texas all the weight they deserved.  While the 
District Court included these facts in its factual recitation, 
they do not appear to have been given any weight in its 
analysis.    
 
The second legal principle we wish to stress relates to 
the consideration to be given to an admittedly self-serving 
affidavit.  Washington submitted an affidavit after defendants 
filed their motion to dismiss, stating that, at the time she filed 
her complaint, she intended to return to Texas and to continue 
to live in Texas once her project in the V.I. was completed.  
Citing Korn, the District Court determined that the affidavit 
“must be disregarded.”  Washington, 2010 WL 1734775, at 
*2.  It provided no further explanation beyond this citation as 
                                                                                                     
Doe v. Schwerzler, 2008 WL 1781986, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 
2008) (finding that plaintiff was domiciled in Kentucky based 
on “proof . . . dispositive on the issue of her citizenship”:  that 
she had registered to vote in Kentucky, had a Kentucky 
driver‟s license, leased property in Kentucky, and paid 
utilities and income taxes there); Murphy v. Miller, 2005 WL 
318749, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (concluding, based on “the 
factors that have been analyzed time and time again in this 
district,” – including defendant‟s opening a bank account in 
California, buying and registering a car there, and applying 
for a California driver‟s license – that he was domiciled in 
California); Messick v. S. Pa. Bus Co., 59 F. Supp. 799 (D.C. 
Pa. 1945) (in finding that plaintiff was domiciled in 
Delaware, attaching significance to his home ownership, bank 
account, and payment of taxes in Delaware).  
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to why it chose to disregard Washington‟s testimony or how 
the situation in Korn maps onto the facts at issue here.     
 
In Korn, we stated that “[o]ne's testimony as to his 
intention to establish a domicile, while entitled to full and fair 
consideration, is subject to the infirmity of any self-serving 
declaration, and it cannot prevail to establish domicile when it 
is contradicted or negatived by an inconsistent course of 
conduct.”  398 F.2d at 691 (emphasis added).  In Korn, a 
divorce action, the plaintiff sought to establish domicile in St. 
Thomas.  He declared in an affidavit that he traveled to St. 
Thomas with the intent to make it his permanent residence 
and domicile.  Yet, as we outlined in detail, his “entire course 
of conduct” contradicted his declaration of intent.4  We thus 
                                              
4
 Plaintiff was a doctor who had practiced osteopathic 
medicine in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for thirty-one years 
before going to St. Thomas.  He had been convicted in 
Philadelphia of performing an illegal abortion and was in the 
midst of divorce proceedings in both Philadelphia and New 
Jersey when he left suddenly for St. Thomas, discontinued the 
pending actions, and commenced a new divorce suit.  Despite 
his testimony that he was coming to the V.I. to “make a new 
life” and start a new practice there, he made no attempt to 
ascertain the requirements for medical licensing until five 
months after arriving there.  Moreover, at the time he filed the 
divorce action, he had made no attempt to establish a 
permanent home in the V.I., had traveled back and forth to 
the U.S. several times, had checked in and out of several 
hotels in the V.I., continued to list his address on official 
documents as Philadelphia, PA, and continued to maintain his 
health insurance in Philadelphia.  Korn, 398 F.3d at 693.    
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discounted his self-serving testimony that he planned to stay 
in the V.I., and drew the “inescapable conclusion” that he was 
forum shopping in his quest for a divorce.  Id. at 693.   
 
However, this is not a case like Korn where “the 
surrounding facts and circumstances clearly indicate” that 
plaintiff‟s testimony is fabricated.  398 F.2d at 691.  To the 
contrary, Washington‟s statement that she intended to return 
to and reside in Texas is buttressed, not contradicted, by her 
course of conduct at the time she filed her complaint.  
Accordingly, Korn is not controlling, and Washington‟s 
affidavit should not have been disregarded.  
 
We think it is important that a court be guided by these 
key legal principles in determining domicile, and we will 
remand for it to do so and render its ruling giving them due 
consideration.   
 
V. 
 
The District Court also made an error of fact.  In its 
brief consideration of the facts pointing toward the V.I., and 
those pointing toward Texas, the District Court twice 
mentioned that Washington‟s business, domestic and social 
life was centered in St. Croix.  Yet, little evidence in the 
record supports this conclusion as to Washington‟s life at the 
time she filed the complaint.  Washington testified to living in 
the same neighborhood as her sister and to starting a romantic 
relationship with a V.I. resident prior to filing her complaint, 
but the record is otherwise lacking in evidence that she 
socialized often with her family or with other V.I. residents or 
that her “business life” in the V.I. went beyond her temporary 
employment assignment there.   
16 
 
On the other hand, the record does contain indicia that 
her stay in the V.I. was transient and not permanent when she 
filed her complaint.  As mentioned above, Washington set up 
none of the trappings of a “true, fixed and permanent home,” 
McCann, 458 F.3d at 286, in the V.I., and her employer was 
paying her a $100 per diem for living expenses at the time she 
filed her complaint.  The District Court does not mention 
these facts in analyzing the issue.   
 
This factual error does not render the District Court‟s 
entire decision clearly erroneous, but it should be corrected 
on remand, as it is not supported by evidence in the record.      
 
VI. 
 
Relatedly, we note that, while it is generally useful to 
analogize fact patterns of other cases and base rulings on 
outcomes in similar cases, it may not be quite so useful in this 
type of case, where the facts presented can vary so slightly, 
and yet the slightest variation leads to a different result.
5
   
 
Here, the District Court concluded that Washington‟s 
statement that the length of her job was “indefinite” when she 
went to the V.I. made her case analogous to the situation in 
Krasnov.  In Krasnov, we ruled that defendant, a member of a 
semi-monastic teaching order headquartered in Connecticut 
                                              
5
 Cf. Gallagher v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 185 F.2d 
543, 546 (3d Cir. 1951) (conceding that “there is a good deal 
of rather ambiguous talk in the cases, some of which might 
arguably be taken to support [the district court‟s] . . . 
position,” but nonetheless reversing the district court‟s 
domicile determination).   
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who was working in Pennsylvania when he filed his 
complaint, was domiciled in Pennsylvania.  Defendant was 
regularly transferred to different locations for teaching 
assignments.  He had very few possessions and owned no 
property other than a foot locker which accompanied him to 
Pennsylvania.  465 F.3d at 1301.  In determining that he was 
a Pennsylvania domiciliary, we considered these facts as well 
as his testimony that he intended to remain in Pennsylvania as 
long as he was assigned to teach there and that the term of his 
teaching assignment was indefinite.  Id. at 1301-02.  
However, there was no discussion in Krasnov of any other, let 
alone established, residence to which the defendant said he 
intended to return.  Unlike Washington, he went from 
assignment to assignment in a different location each time.  
This variation in the facts makes a difference; here, we think, 
it is an important one.  Washington‟s testimony as to her lack 
of knowledge of the length of her assignment in the V.I. is not 
analogous to the situation in Krasnov.  
 
Accordingly, we will vacate and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
VII. 
 
Washington also challenges the Magistrate Judge‟s 
orders denying her motion for extension of expert deadlines 
and granting defendants‟ motion to compel a medical 
examination.
6
  We find that, because Washington failed to 
                                              
6
 We review a district court‟s discovery order for abuse of 
discretion, and we will not disturb such an order absent a 
showing of actual or substantial prejudice.  Anderson v. 
Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.2d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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follow the proper procedure to object to the Magistrate 
Judge‟s order denying extension of expert deadlines, she has 
waived her right to challenge this order on appeal.  See 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 
1001, 1006 (3d Cir. 1987).  Moreover, even if the issue were 
not waived, we discern no abuse of discretion in the 
Magistrate Judge‟s denial of Washington‟s request based on a 
finding that Washington failed to establish good cause for 
modifying the scheduling order.  The Magistrate Judge also 
did not abuse his discretion in granting appellees‟ motion to 
compel a medical examination and in requiring Washington 
to pay the expenses of the examination.  Accordingly, we 
affirm the Magistrate Judge‟s rulings on these motions.   
